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PRODUCTS LIABILITY: COMPONENT PART




TN TODAY'S LITIGIOUS society a lawsuit often in-
volves everybody who could conceivably be held liable.
The plaintiff is often searching for the person with the
"deepest pocket."' If a product in some manner causes
an injury, everyone involved in production or distribution
of that product, from the maker of a screw to the person
who ultimately sold the product to the consumer, might
expect to be a defendant in a lawsuit.2 Such a situation
arises often in the aircraft industry due to the number of
One of the reasons for joining multiple parties is the theory of joint and sev-
eral liability. Under this theory, each defendant is liable for the entire amount of a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Thus the plaintiff can collect the entire judg-
ment from one defendant. For example , a jury may find damages in the amount
of $100,000 and apportion fault in the following percentages: plaintiff 10%; de-
fendant A 25%; defendant B 30%; and defendant C 35%. The plaintiff may re-
cover the entire judgment of $90,000 from either A, B or C. That defendant will
have to seek contribution from other defendants, who may or may not have the
ability to do so. If the plaintiff collects the entire amount from A, then A can seek
contribution from B of $30,000 and from C of $35,000. However, there may be
some limitations. Assume the jury apportions fault as follows: plaintiff 25% and
defendants A, B and C 10%, 30% and 35%, respectively. Under a "modified"
comparative fault system, defendant A is only liable up to his percentage of fault
since his percentage of fault is less than the plaintiff's. See, e.g., TEx. Civ. PRAc. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 33.012 (Vernon 1986).
2 Note at this point that liability under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A extends to both manufacturers and retailers, regardless of fault. See infra
notes 13-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of the elements of a cause of
action under § 402A.
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people injured in accidents involving aircraft and the
complexity involved in the manufacture of an aircraft.
The liability of a component part manufacturer creates
problems in the determination of responsibility for inju-
ries. When a component part malfunctions, it seems rea-
sonably clear that the manufacturer will be accountable
for the resulting injury. The manufacturer's liability is not
so clear, however, when other types of defects in the com-
ponent product are involved in the lawsuit.
Consider the following hypothetical involving a design
defect:3
Rotor, Inc. manufactures rotors for helicopters that are
hollow and pressurized with nitrogen. Helicopter, Inc. as-
sembles helicopters and sells them to various customers.
A helicopter manufactured by Helicopter, Inc. and
equipped with Rotor, Inc. rotors crashes, killing its occu-
pants. The cause of the crash was a crack developed in a
rotor blade while in flight that allowed the pressurized ni-
trogen to escape.
Assume that the plaintiff's only claim is of a design defect
due to the lack of a safety device in the cockpit that would
have warned the pilot of a nitrogen leak. Who should
bear the responsibility for the installation of such a safety
device: the assembler of the helicopter or the manufac-
turer of the component part? Should both Rotor, Inc. and
Helicopter, Inc. be liable?4
In addition, consider the following hypothetical involv-
See infra notes 23-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of the types of
defects under § 402A.
4 The facts in this hypothetical are loosely based on Haas v. United Technolo-
gies Corp., 450 A.2d 1173 (Del. 1982). In Haas, the defendant's subdivision was
the manufacturer of the helicopter. The case does not indicate who manufactured
the rotors and there is no issue of component part liabilty. The manufacturer
equipped the helicopter with a gauge located outside the cockpit so that the occu-
pants could not check the pressure while in flight. Id. at 1175. At the trial level,
the court presented to the jury the issue of whether the absence of a warning
device in the cockpit constituted a design defect. Id. at 1176. The jury returned a
verdict in favor of the defendant and the Delaware Supreme Court held that the
trial court properly instructed the jury on the issue of design defect under § 402A.
Id. at 1177. Although the court in Haas held that the defendant was not liable, the
basic facts are useful for purposes of analysis.
ing a warning defect: 5
Elevator, Inc. manufactures aircraft "elevators," that con-
trol the upward and downward movement of the airplane
and also manufactures "trim tabs" that are attached to the
elevators and help relieve the force created by the opera-
tion of the elevators. Elevator, Inc. purchases from Actua-
tor, Inc. "elevator trim tab actuators" which are the
control mechanism for the directional movement of the
trim tabs. There are two actuators, one for each side of
the airplane. The right and left actuators are visually iden-
tical, yet functionally distinct. Elevator, Inc. sells the eleva-
tors, trim tabs and actuators as a package to aircraft
manufacturers who assemble and install them in aircraft.
An aircraft crashes due to the installation of a right actua-
tor on the left side of the airplane and the installation of a
left actuator on the right side of the airplane.
Assume that the plaintiff's only claim is that the actuators
were defective because of the lack of a warning of the dis-
tinct functions of the right and left actuators. Who should
bear the liability for failure to give a warning: the manu-
facturer of the actuator or the seller of the complete pack-
age? Should both Actuator, Inc. and Elevator, Inc. be
liable?6
This comment will attempt to solve the liability ques-
tions presented by these two different situations under
section 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS.
There are two primary approaches courts take in solving
See infra notes 23-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of the types of
defects under § 402A.
(I The facts in this hypothetical are loosely based on Nesselrode v. Executive
Beechcraft, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. 1986). In Nesselrode, the defendant Beech
Aircraft Corporation manufactured and designed the elevator trim tab actuators.
Id. at 373. The defendant Executive Beechcraft, Inc. installed new trim tab actua-
tors after a periodic inspection of the aircraft. Id. at 374. In addtion to negligence,
the plaintiff based its action on both design and warning defects under § 402A.
Id. at 374-75. The basis for the claim of design defect is that the defendant should
have designed the trim tab actuators such that a person could not install them
improperly. Id. The basis for the claim of a warning defect was that the defendant
should have placed a warning on the elevators that they were visually identical but
functionally distinct. Id. at 374. At trial the jury found that the trim tab actuators
were defectively designed and that there was an inadequate warning. Id. at 371.
The Supreme Court of Missouri eventually affirmed in a close decision. Id.
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the issues posed in the hypotheticals. Both approaches,
however, tend to result in the imposition of an "all or
nothing" method of ascertaining liability. One approach
generally results in the imposition ofjoint and several lia-
bility on both the manufacturer of the component part
and the assembler of the final product. The other line of
cases imposes liability solely on one of the potential de-
fendants. Neither approach takes into account the availa-
bility of comparative fault or responsibility doctrines.7
After describing these approaches, this comment will ad-
dress an alternative approach that considers the use of
comparative doctrines. However, before discussing these
approaches to solving the liability issue, this article will
discuss the nature and elements of a products liability
claim under section 402A and of a claim involving compo-
nent part manufacturers.
II. LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 402A
A. Generally
A majority ofjurisdictions have adopted the doctrine of
strict products liability under section 402A of the RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. 8  The purpose behind
strict products liability is to compensate persons for inju-
7 See infra notes 31-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of comparative
fault doctrines.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Section 402A provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or con-
sumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or en-
tered into any contractual relation with the seller.
Id.; see 63 AM.JUR. 2D Products Liability §§ 537-38 (1984) for a summary ofjurisdic-
tions adopting or rejecting § 402A.
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ries that result from use of a defective product. 9 One of
the justifications for the creation of section 402A is that
holding defendants liable for the introduction of a defec-
tive product into the stream of commerce will result in
safer products.10 Another reason for imposing strict lia-
bility is that manufacturers and sellers of products can ab-
sorb the loss of an injury and spread the costs to the
consumers of their product." Although strict liability
purportedly imposes liability without fault, there must be
a sufficient relationship between the plaintiff's injuries
and the defendant's products. 12
B. Elements of Cause of Action Under Section 402A
To state a cause of action under section 402A, a prod-
uct must have caused the plaintiff's injuries.' 3 The de-
, Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 987, 901, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962). In Greenman, Chief Justice Robert Traynor of the
California Supreme Court stated that, "[tihe purpose of [strict] liability is to in-
sure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the
manufacturers who put them on the market rather than by the injured persons
who are powerless to protect themselves." Id.
1" Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 457, 150 P.2d 436, 440
(1944). Justice Traynor stated in his historic concurring opinion that "public pol-
icy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce
the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach the mar-
ket." Id.
I Id. at 441. In Escola Traynor stated that "[t]he cost of an injury and the loss
of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a
needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distrib-
uted among the public as a cost of doing business." Id.
12 Southwire Co. v. Beloit Eastern Corp., 370 F. Supp. 842, 858 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
In Southwire, the court dealt with the issues of proximate cause and with substan-
tial change in the product stating that § 402A was "not meant to impose upon
each manufacturer and seller an absolute liability as insurer for all injuries to con-
sumers, regardless of the relation of plaintiff's injuries to the particular defend-
ant's product." Id.
In Section 402A applies to products, as distinguished from services. See, e.g.,
Brody v. Overlook Hospital, 121 NJ. Super. 299, 296 A.2d 668 (Law Div. 1972)
(holding that blood sold to a patient was a product), rev'd on other grounds, 127 N.J.
Super. 331, 317 A.2d 392 (App. Div. 1974), aff'd, 66 N.J. 448, 332 A.2d 596
(1975). Originally, concepts of strict liability were applied to situations involving
the sale of food. See Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 615, 210 N.E.2d
182, 185 (1965). However, the courts have since extended the doctrine to all
products. See, e.g., id., 210 N.E.2d at 186. The comments to § 402A state that
"[t]he rule stated in this Section is not limited to the sale of food for human con-
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fendant must also be in the business of selling such a
product.' 4 Because strict liability is liability without fault,
it applies even though the manufacturer or retailer was
not negligent. 5 The product must be in a defective condi-
tion that is unreasonably dangerous to the user or con-
sumer.' 6 Furthermore, the defect must exist at the time it
left control of the defendant.' 7
Lack of privity between the manufacturer and the in-
jured party is not a defense to an action under section
402A.18 In addition, the fact that the plaintiff did not dis-
cover the defect is not a defense to an action under sec-
tion 402A.19 However, the plaintiff's voluntary and
unreasonable use of the product in disregard of the dan-
gerous nature of the product may constitute a defense.20
In addition, a seller or manufacturer will not be liable if
sumption, or other products for intimate bodily use, although it will obviously
include them." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment d (1965).
14 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(l)(a) (1965). Comment f provides:
Section [402A] applies to any person engaged in the business of sell-
ing products for use or consumption. It therefore applies to any
manufacturer of such a product, to any wholesale or retail dealer or
distributor, and to the operator of a restaurant.
Id. § 402A comment f. Thus, anyone who causes the defective product to enter
the stream of commerce may be held liable under § 402A.
,. Id. § 402A(2)(b). Section 402A states that it applies even though "the seller
has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product .... " Id.
t Id. § 402A(l).
17 Id. § 402A(1)(b). Section 402A requires that the product be "expected to
and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition
in which it is sold." Id.
i" Section 402A states that it applies even though "the user or consumer has
not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the
seller." Id. § 402A(2)(b) (1965); see, e.g., Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d at
612, 210 N.E.2d at 188 (holding the manufacturer of a brake system in a tractor
liable under § 402A).
11, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1965). Comment n
addresses contributory negligence of the plaintiff stating that "[c]ontributory neg-
ligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such negligence consists merely in
failure to discover the defect in the product, or to guard against the possibilty of
its existence." Id.
2-" Id. Comment n further states: "On the other hand the form of contributory
negligence which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encoun-
ter a known danger, and commonly passes under the name of assumption of risk,
is a defense under [§ 402A] as in other cases of strict liability." Id.
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the consumer misused the product. 2 I Application of these
defenses may vary from one jurisdiction to another.22
Under section 402A there are three types of defects:
manufacturing defects, design defects, and warning de-
fects.2 3 A manufacturing defect occurs when the product
does not meet the manufacturer's own specifications. An
example of a manufacturing defect would be when an air-
plane manufacturer improperly installs a wing and it de-
taches in flight.24 A design defect, on the other hand,
does not involve a malfunction. On the contrary, the
product reached the user in the condition intended by the
manufacturer. A design defect occurs when the product,
as designed, is unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer. 25 An example of a design defect would be
21 Id. § 402A comment h. Examples given in the comments to § 402A include
the user knocking a bottle against a radiator in order to open it, adding too much
salt to food, or a child eating too much candy. Id.
2 For example, in Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984),
the Texas Supreme Court combined the defenses of assumption of risk and mis-
use and labelled the combined defense "contributory negligence." Id. at 428.
2- Jiminez v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 552 F. Supp. 301, 303-04 (S.D.N.Y.
1982), rev'd on other grounds, 736 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1984).
2' Note that a cause of action based on strict liability does not replace a cause of
action based on negligence. If the plaintiff can show that the defendant failed to
exercise reasonable or ordinary care, he can also recover under a negligence the-
ory. Under strict liability, the plaintiff need only show that the product was defec-
tive when it left the hands of the defendant. See, e.g., Nesselrode, 707 S.W.2d at 371
(plaintiff alleged both negligence and strict liability against manufacturer of eleva-
tor trim tab actuators).
2 A typical instruction to a jury on the issue of a design defect is:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that at the time
the [product] in question was manufactured by [the manufacturer]
the [product] was defectively designed? By the term "defectively
designed" as used in this issue is meant a product that is unreasona-
bly dangerous as designed taking into consideration the utility of the
product and the risk involved in its use.
Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 847 (Tex. 1979). This instruc-
tion reflects what may be termed a "risk-utility" test. Compare an instruction re-
flecting what is termed a "consumer expectation" test:
By the term "defectively designed" as used in this issue is meant a
design that is unreasonably dangerous. "Unreasonably dangerous"
means dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contem-
plated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary
knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.
Id. at 846.
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when an airplane manufacturer installed a wing that
would not withstand certain changes in altitude, where an
alternative design would function properly.26 The third
type of defect under section 402A involves a failure to
warn the consumer of the dangerous nature of the
product.2
7
C. Causation and Comparative Fault Doctrines
The element of causation is an important issue in any
products liability action. In order for a plaintiff to recover
under section 402A, the defect must be the cause of in-
jury.28 Generally, the plaintiff must prove that the defec-
tive product was both the cause in fact 29 and proximate
cause30 of his injury. The analysis of causation in a prod-
ucts liability claim is similar to an action for negligence.
In both negligence and strict liability cases, the exist-
21 A common and controversial type of defect involves liability for enhanced
injuries. This situation, also known as crashworthiness, arises where the product
did not cause an accident, but because of defective design, the plaintiff incurred
enhanced injuries. See, e.g., Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d at 414
(involving design defect of aircraft seats). See generally Comment, Crashworthiness
Claims in Aviation Accidents, 53J. AIRL. & CoM. 219 (1987).
27 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965). Comment j to
§ 402A states: "In order to prevent the product from being unreasonably danger-
ous, the seller may be required to give instructions or warning, on the container,
as to its use." Id. A warning defect may also occur where the manufacturer cannot
make the product safe for its intended use. Id. § 402A comment k. The com-
ments state that "[sluch a product properly prepared, and accompanied by proper
directions and warning, is not.defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous." Id. (em-
phasis in original); see, e.g., Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th
Cir. 1968) (involving warning as to possible effects of polio vaccine).
28 Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 196 Col. 162, 583 P.2d 276, 283 (1978).
29 Cause in fact, or actual causation, corresponds to common sense 'notion of
whether the product actually caused the plaintiff's injuries. Often the test applied
is stated as "but for" the defective product, the plaintiff would not have been
injured. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 432 (1965).
.1 Relying solely on actual causation will often result in holding defendants lia-
ble for the most far reaching and bizarre consequences of their acts. Proximate
cause, or legal causation, is a policy doctrine that draws the line between whether
the defendant will be held liable or not. Generally, a defendant will be liable for
those consequences which are reasonably forseeable. Cf Palsgraf v. Long Island
R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928) (plaintiff not entitled to recover for her
injuries because third person causing injury unable to anticipate any danger to
plaintiff).
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ence of contributory negligence or product misuse com-
plicates the allocation of responsibility for injuries. A
similar problem arises when courts attempt to apportion
liability between multiple tortfeasors. 3 ' To combat this
problem, many states have adopted, either by statute32 or
judicial decision,3 3 a system of comparative negligence. 4
Such a system apportions the costs of an injury among
negligent plaintiffs, negligent defendants and strict liabil-
ity defendants."
Courts have had conceptual difficulty in extending com-
parative fault doctrines to actions involving liability in
tort. 6 The difficulty arises in applying a doctrine founded
in negligence to a doctrine of liability without fault.3 7 Crit-
ics assert that comparative fault is a negligence concept
that is irrelevant in a strict liability analysis.3 8 Despite the
conceptual roadblocks, a number of jurisdictions have ju-
dicially adopted a comparative fault doctrine with respect
to strict liability actions, either through extension of con-
-, The problem is even more complicated when there are multiple claims such
as negligence, strict liability and breach of warranty. See, e.g., Duncan v. Cessna
Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d at 414.
.12 See, e.g., TEX. Civ. PRc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.001 (Vernon Supp. 1987)
for an example of adoption of comparative responsibility (negligence) in negli-
gence cases. Texas adopted what is called "modified" comparative negligence in
that a plaintiff "may recover damages only if his percentage of responsibility is
less than or equal to 50 percent." Id. § 33.001(a).
.1. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858
(1975) for an example of judicial adoption of "pure" comparative negligence. In
adopting pure comparative negligence the California Supreme Court stated that a
modified system distorts the principle that "persons are responsible for their acts
to the extent their fault contributes to an injurious result." Id. at 1243 (citation
omitted).
.1 Different jurisdictions utilize various terminology such as comparative negli-
gence, comparative fault, comparative responsibility, and comparative causation.
Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 SW.2d at 424.
: Id.
Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr.
380 (1978).
17 Id. at 730, 575 P.2d at 1167, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 385. Critics state that applica-
tion of comparative fault doctrine to strict liability is analogous to mixing "apples
with oranges" or "oil and water." Id.
., Id. Some courts also assert semantic difficulties in that comparative "fault" is
incompatible with a strict liability principle where the defendant's fault, or lack
thereof, is not at issue. Id.
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tributory negligence statutes39  or otherwise .4 0 Some
states have either general or specific statutes that mandate
the application of comparative principles in strict liability
actions.41
Implementation of comparative fault in practice re-
quires proper instructions to the jury in a products liabil-
ity suit. There are several different forms of instruction to
the jury depending upon the nature of the plaintiff's
claim, the number of defendants, and the existence of any
defenses. For instance, if the plaintiff alleges both negli-
gence and strict liability the jury instruction will ask
whether the defendant(s) was (were) negligent, whether
- See, e.g., Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967) (applying a
comparative negligence statute directly to a strict products liability action by ana-
lyzing strict liability as negligence per se); see also Suter v. San Angelo Foundry &
Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979) (stating that the concept of strict
liability was consistent with the intent of the comparative negligence statute). For
a list of states with comparative negligence statutes, see Brewster, Comparative Neg-
ligence in Strict Liabiliy Cases, 42J. AIR L. & COM. 107 n.2 (1976). For a discussion
of different approaches to adoption of comparative fault in strict liability see 1
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 9.20 (1988).
4,, See, e.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d at 725, 575 P.2d at 1162,
144 Cal. Rptr. at 380 (extending comparative negligence expressed in Li v. Yellow
Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d at 804, 532 P.2d at 1126, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 858 to strict lability
actions); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d at 414 (refusing to extend
comparative negligence statute but adopting comparative principles for strict lia-
bility causes of action).
41 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 6-1304 (Supp. 1987) (comparative responsibility stat-
ute appling to any action "to recover damages for product liability resulting in
death or injury to person or property"); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.2949
(West Cum. Supp. 1986) (application of comparative principles to "all products
liabilty actions"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,185 (1985) (comparative statute ap-
pling to "all actions brought to recover damages for injuries to a person or to his
property caused by the negligence or act or omission giving rise to strict liability
in tort of another"). Texas recently amended its "modified" comparative negli-
gence statute to include actions based on strict liability as a response to Duncan v.
Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d at 414, where the Texas Supreme Court adopted
"pure" comparative causation in strict liability actions. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 33.001(b) (Vernon Supp. 1987). At the time of the Duncan decision,
Texas statutes mandated "modified" comparative responsiblity in negligence ac-
tions. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.001 (Vernon 1986). The court
adopted comparative causation without reliance on the comparative negligence
statute, and therefore adopted a "pure" form of comparative causation in strict
liability actions. Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d at 427-28. For an
analysis of the decision in Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co. see Note, Strict Products
Liability-Judical Adoption of Pure Comparative Apportionment of Liability, 49 J. AIR L. &
COM. 1021 (1984).
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the plaintiff was negligent, whether the product was de-
fective and whether the plaintiff misused the product or
assumed the risk.4 2 If the jury answers yes to any of these
questions, then the instruction will ask them to apportion
responsibility to the product and each of the parties. 43 Of
course, the form of instruction will differ depending on
the jurisdiction.
III. LIABILITY OF COMPONENT PART MANUFACTURERS
A. Generally
A difficult issue in the area of products liability is the
liability of a manufacturer or supplier of a component part
for injuries caused by defects in the assembled product.
In Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.,44 the plaintiff
brought an action for breach of warranty against the man-
ufacturer of a defective altimeter and the assembler of the
airplane. The court refused to hold the component part
manufacturer liable, stating that the airplane manufac-
turer provided adequate protection to injured parties.4 5
42 For example, the charge to the jury may ask:
Was the Product X defective?
Was Defendant Y negligent?
Was Plaintiff Z negligent?
The court would define what the legal standards are for product defects and
negligence.
4. The next instruction would ask the jury to apportion fault to the parties
based on the evidence presented at trial. For example, the court in Duncan v.
Cessna Aircraft Co. suggested the following instruction:
Find from a preponderance of the evidence the percentage of plain-





Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d at 427 n.8.
4 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
' Id. 191 N.E.2d at 83. The court stated:
[Flor the present at least we do not think it necessary so to extend
this rule as to hold liable the manufacturer of a component part.
Adequate protection is provided for the passengers by casting in lia-
bility the airplane manufacturer which put into the market the com-
pleted aircraft.
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To complicate matters, the writers of section 402A ex-
press no opinion as to whether strict liability applies to
component part manufacturers.46
Despite the decision in Goldberg and the caveat in the
RESTATEMENT, a majority ofjurisdictions hold that a com-
ponent part manufacturer can be liable under section
402A.47 As in any case concerning liability under section
402A, the defendant must be engaged in the business of
selling such products.4  Generally, the component part
must be in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer.49 In addition, the product must
reach the consumer without substantial change,5° how-
ever, small changes or minor alterations will not relieve
the component part manufacturer from liability. 5' The
4o RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Section 402A includes the
following caveats:
The institute expresses no opinion as to whether the rules stated in
this Section may not apply
(1) to harm to persons other than users or consumers;
(2) to the seller of a product expected to be processed or otherwise
substantially changed before it reaches the user or consumer; or
(3) to the seller of a component part of a product to be assembled.
Id. (emphasis added). Comment q to § 402A provides:
It is no doubt to be expected that where there is no change in the
component part itself, but it is merely incorporated into something
larger, the strict liability will be found to carry through to the ulti-
mate user or consumer. But in the absence of a sufficient number of
decisions on the matter to justify a conclusion, the Institute ex-
presses no opinion on the matter.
Id. comment q.
41 Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 583 P.2d at 281; see also Suvada v. White Motor
Co., 210 N.E.2d at 182 (holding a manufacturer of a defective brake system incor-
porated into a truck liable under § 402A); Burbage v. Boiler Eng'g & Supply Co.,
433 Pa. 319, 249 A.2d 563 (1969) (holding manufacturer of a defective boiler
valve liable under § 402A).
Is Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 583 P.2d at 283; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS
§ 402A (1965), supra note 8.
41 Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 583 P.2d at 282. Some jurisdictions have elimi-
nated the "unreasonably dangerous" language because it indicates negligence in
a strict liability cause of action. Id. n.5.
.- RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(l)(b) (1965); see supra note 8 for
the text of § 402A. Comment q to § 402A states that where there is no change in
the component part, the manufacturer will be liable. Id. § 402A comment q; see
supra note 46 for the text of comment q.
" Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 583 P.2d at 283. Comment p to § 402A discusses
further processing and substantial change stating:
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courts in various jurisdictions analyze the question of sub-
stantial change differently. 52
B. Failure to Provide a Safety Device as a Design Defect
One type of design defect covered under section 402A
is a manufacturer's failure to provide a safety device.5 3
It seems reasonably clear that the mere fact that the product is to
undergo processing, or other substantial change, will not in all cases
relieve the seller of liability under the rule stated in [§ 402A]. If, for
example, raw coffee beans are sold to a buyer who roasts and packs
them for sale to the ultimate consumer, it cannot be supposed that
the seller will be relieved of all liability when the raw beans are con-
taminated with arsenic, or some other poison. . . . On the other
hand, the manufacturer of pigiron, which is capable of a wide variety
of uses, is not so likely to be held to strict liability when it turns out
to be unsuitable for the child's tricycle into which it is finally made
by a remote buyer. The question is essentially one of whether the
responsibility for discovery and prevention of the dangerous defect
is shifted to the intermediate party who is to make the changes.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment p (1965).
5 The court in Union Supply Co. v. Pust stated that "[tihe element of 'without
substantial change' has been strictly adhered to in most decisions that have held
component part manufacturers strictly liable." Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 583
P.2d at 282. In Southwire Co. v. Beloit E. Corp., 370 F. Supp. 842 (E.D. Pa.
1974), the court compared the issue of substantial change to the theory of inter-
vening superceding cause. Id. at 855-57. Intervening superceding cause is a negli-
gence concept where "an act of another person or force which by its intervention
prevents, the defendant from being liable for harm to another which his antece-
dent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about." Id. at 857 n.21. The
court stated that:
Since a defendant in a § 402A action- can be held liable without
proof of any fault on his part, this broad liability should not be im-
posed on a faultless defendant unless the plaintiff can prove a chain
of causation linking the defendant's defective product to plaintiff's
injury without substantial changes that may be less significant than
intervening superceding causes needed to negate the liability of a
negligent defendant. On the other hand, since § 402A liability is
designed to be broader than negligence liability, it would be consis-
tent with the intent of § 402A to require that, for a substantial
change to negate § 402A liability, it must be at least as significant a
break in the chain of causation as an intervening superceding cause
is in negligence law.
Id. The court decided the case on other grounds and did not adopt either of these
theories in its opinion. Id.
r:, See generally 28 AM. LAw PROD. LIAB. 3D §§ 28.73-28.83 (1987) for a discus-
sion of safety features and devices as a design defect; Annotation, Products Liability:
Manufacturer's or Seller's Obligation to Supply or Recommend Available Safety Accessories in
Connection with Industrial Machinery or Equipment, 99 A.L.R. 3d 693 (1980); Annota-
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The test applied to this type of claim is that the product,
absent a safety device, is unreasonably dangerous to users
or consumers. 54 Whether the product is unreasonably
dangerous will depend on the outcome of a balancing test
weighing the utility of the product against the risk inher-
ent in its design.55 Factors considered in this analysis are
the loss of utility of the product because of the safety de-
vice, 56 industry custom, 57 and the multifunctional nature
of the product.58  No one factor, however, is
determinative.59
As indicated in the first hypothetical in the introduc-
tion, a difficult issue arises when a component part is in-
corporated in a larger product and the plaintiff alleges the
failure to provide a safety device. As discussed earlier,
section 402A subjects component part manufacturers to
liability for defective products that cause injury or harm to
users or consumers. 60 Courts differ, however, in ap-
proaches to the question of whether the component part
manufacturer or the assembler of the final product should
be liable for the failure to provide a safety device in the
final product. Generally, whether the component part
was defective because of a lack of a safety device is a fac-
tual question.6' Courts differ, however, on the extent of
tion, Products Liability: Duty of Manufacturer to Equip Product with Safety Device Against
Patent or Obvious Danger, 95 A.L.R. 3d 1066 (1979).
.4 See Skyhook Corp. v. Jasper, 90 N.M. 143, 147, 560 P.2d 934, 938 (1977).
. Jiminez v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 736 F.2d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'g, 552
F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Michalko v. Cooke Color and Chem. Corp., 91 NJ.
386, 451 A.2d 179, 182-83 (1982). Some jurisdictions use a consumer expecta-
tion test in addition to or in lieu of a risk-utility test. See supra note 25 for an
example of a jury instruction incorporating a risk-utility test and an instruction
incorporating a consumer expectation test. See generally 17 AM. LAw PROD. LIAB.
3D §§ 17.8, 17.34 (1987).
- Jiminez, 731 F.2d at 54.
" Id.
Turney v. Ford Motor Co., 94 I1. App. 3d 678, 418 N.E.2d 1079 (1981).
Jiminez, 731 F.2d at 54. 6
See supra notes 44-52 accompanying text for a discussion of component part
liability.
- See Mott v. Callahan AMS Mach, Co., 174 NJ. Super. 202, 416 A.2d 57




this factual inquiry.6 2
In Bexiga v. Havir Manufacturing Corp.,63 the defendant
manufactured a ten-ton punch press. The defendant sold
the press to the plaintiff's employer and did not incorpo-
rate any safety devices other than a guard over the fly-
wheel. 6" While the plaintiff was using the machine to
punch holes in metal discs, he attempted to adjust a disc
in the machine. 65 The plaintiff did not remove his foot
from the pedal which activates the machine and, as a re-
sult, the machine crushed his hand. 66 The plaintiff
presented evidence of two types of safety devices utilized
in the industry: one, a push-button device which would
require the use of both hands for the machine to operate
and alternatively, a guardrail or gate to prevent the opera-
tor from putting his hands into the machine while it was
operating.67 The defendant introduced evidence that the
custom of the trade was for the purchasers to provide
such safety devices. 68
The trial court dismissed the cause of action and the
appellate court affirmed stating that, based on industry
practice, the manufacturer did not expect that the punch
press would reach the user without substantial change.69
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, stating that the
substantial change rule in the section 402A70 does not ap-
ply where it absolves a manufacturer of liability if he ex-
pects the purchaser to provide safety devices. 7' The court
held that a jury could find that failure to incorporate a
safety device created a defective product unless the inclu-
12 See generally 8 AM. LAW PROD. LIAB. 3D § 8.15 (1987).
60 NJ. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972).
' Id. at 282.
"' Id. at 283.
fil Id.
- Id. The plaintiff based his cause of action on negligence, breach of warranty
and strict products liability.
*"Id.
Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 114 N.J. Super. 397, 403-04, 276 A.2d 590, 595
(1971).
71, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(l)(b) (1965); see supra note 8 for
the text of § 402A.
7 Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 290 A.2d at 285.
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sion of a safety device would make the product unusable
for its intended purpose.72 Evidence of trade custom,
therefore, is not conclusive as to the duty to provide a
safety device.73 Although the Bexiga decision does not in-
volve a component part manufacturer, it is analogous to a
situation where a component part manufacturer relies on
the assembler of the final product to install a safety
device.
In Union Supply Co. v. Pust,7 4 the defendant manufac-
tured a conveyer for a sugar refining company. The pur-
chaser added several parts, including the motor, conveyor
belt, electrical controls, legs for support, stairs, walkways,
and the counterweight.75 The plaintiff caught his arm in
the "nip point ' 76 of the conveyer while trying to clean the
conveyer belts.77 The plaintiff asserted that the conveyor
was defectively designed in that it did not have a safety
guard at the "nip point" and because there was no warn-
ing of the hazards present at the "nip point. ' 78 The trial
court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint, but the court of
appeals reversed.79
The Colorado Supreme Court had never imposed lia-
bility on a manufacturer on the basis of a design defect
7Y Id. The court stated that "[t]he public interest in assuring that safety devices
are installed demands more from the manufacturer than to permit him to leave
such a critical phase of his manufacturing process to the haphazard conduct of the
ultimate purchaser." Id.
7. Id.
74 583 P.2d at 276.
7. Id. at 279. The opinion notes that both Union Supply Co. and Holly Sugar
Corp., the purchaser of the conveyor, were involved in the design of the conveyor.
Id.
7,1 A "nip point" is created where a conveyor belt moves over a stationary ob-
ject. See generally Annotation, Products Liability: Industrial Accidents Involving Conveyor
Belts or Systems, 2 A.L.R. 4th 262 (1980).
77 Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 583 P.2d at 278.
7I Id. at 279.
7,) Pust v. Union Supply Co., 38 Colo. App. 435, 561 P.2d 355 (1987). Union
Supply joined the purchaser, Holly Sugar Corporation, as a third party defendant.
At the appellate level, Union Supply cross-appealed the dismissal of the third
party complaint. The Colorado Supreme Court subsequently held in favor of
Holly Sugar Corporation in Holly Sugar Corp. v. Union Supply Co., 144 Col. 316,
572 P.2d 148 (1977).
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before Union Supply. 80 After holding that a design defect
can be a basis for strict liability, 8' the court discussed the
liability of a component part manufacturer.8 2 The court
noted a distinction between manufacturing defects and
design defects when addressing the liability of a compo-
nent part manufacturer.8 3 Nevertheless, the court held
that a jury could find that there was a design defect be-
cause of the failure to provide a safety device in the con-
veyer sections that Union Supply provided to the
purchaser.84
Union Supply attempted to introduce evidence that it
expected the purchaser to supply a safety guard.85 The
court rejected this evidence as irrelevant because it re-
lated to a negligence analysis rather than a strict liability
claim. 86 The court then stated that the issue was not who
had the duty to provide the safety device, but whether the
product was defective because of the failure to incorpo-
rate a safety guard.87 Accordingly, the court held that if
,o Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 583 P.2d at 280.
81 Id. The court held that if"a product is unreasonably dangerous because of a
defect in its design strict liability may lie." Id.
82 Id. at 281. Before discussing component part liability, the court stated that it
was possible that a jury could find both Holly Sugar and Union Supply were de-
signers of the conveyor, in which case both could be liable under § 402A for de-
fective design. Id. However, Holly Sugar presumably could not be liable to the
plaintiff even though it assembled the conveyor because it was the plaintiff's em-
ployer and thus subject to a workman's compensation statute. The court dis-
cussed component part liability as an alternative grounds for liability under §
402A. Id.
83 Id. at 282. The court stated: "Unlike defects in manufacture-such as a de-
fective tire assembly in an automobile or a defective fuse in a hand grenade-
defects in design are not easily attributed to one component part or group of
parts." Id.
94 Id.
., Id. at 283.
al Id.
,7 Id. The court stated that:
This evidence injects into the case the irrelevant negligence issue of
who had the duty to install safety guards. In strict liability cases, we
are not concerned with who had the duty to provide guards, but
rather with whether the conveyor was in a defective condition unrea-
sonably dangerous because of the failure to provide safety guards
before it reached the ultimate user or consumer.
Id. (citations omitted).
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the proper elements of an action under section 402A were
present, Union Supply would be liable for failure to pro-
vide a safety device.8 8 Thus under the Union Supply analy-
sis, a component part is defective if it is feasible to
incorporate a safety device and the manufacturer fails to
do so. 8 9
In Parkins. v. Van Doren Sales, Inc. ,90 a Washington court
of appeal reached a similar result. The plaintiff sustained
severe injuries to her hand, wrist, and elbow when her
hand was caught in the nip point of a conveyer belt.9' Van
Doren Sales sold component parts to Wenoka Fruit Pack-
ing Plant, the plaintiff's employer, which Wenoka used to
build the conveyer system.92 Van Doren did not provide
any guards or warning labels with the component parts.93
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
Van Doren; however, the court of appeals reversed and
" Id. at 282-83. The court listed the following elements of an action under
§ 402A:
1. The component part "must be in 'a defective condition unrea-
sonably dangerous' to the user or consumer."
2. "[T]he product 'is expected to and does reach the user or con-
sumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is
sold.' " (citation omitted).
3. "[T]he design defect must be the cause of the plaintiff's injury."
4. "[T]he defendant sold this product and is engaged in the busi-
ness of selling such products." (citation omitted).
5. "The final element, of course, is that the plaintiff has sustained
damages as a result."
Id. at 282-83; see also supra notes 13-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the elements of an action under § 402A.
81) Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 583 P.2d at 282-83. The court also discussed the
failure to warn of the danger at the "nip point" as a warning defect under § 402A.
The court stated that the jury could find that "failure to attach warnings at the 'nip
point' created a 'defective condition unreasonably dangerous' to the user or con-
sumer." Id. at 283-84. The court stated the elements of such an action are the
same as that of a design defect and would extend to a component part manufac-
turer. Id.
8, 45 Wash. App. 19, 724 P.2d 389 (1986).
Id. at 20-21, 724 P.2d at 391.
92 Id.
w, Id. Van Doren left the task of providing a guard or warning to Wenoka; how-
ever, Van Doren incorporates guards and warnings of the danger at the nip point
when it sells assembled conveyor systems to other customers. Id. at 21-22, 724
P.2d at 391-92.
remanded.9 4
Applying Washington product liability statutes,9 5 the
court stated that a jury could find that Van Doren should
have provided a safety device based on its practice of pro-
viding guards when it installed conveyors.9 6 The court re-
jected Van Doren's argument that it was not feasible to
install guards because they merely sold the component
parts.97 The court stated that the basic design of the con-
veyer system does not change, regardless of who assem-
bles the parts.98
In Verge v. Ford Motor Co. ,99 the Third Circuit developed
a much different approach to the issue of a component
part manufacturer's liability for failure to provide a safety
device. In Verge, the plaintiff broke his leg when a co-
worker backed up a garbage truck and pinned him against
a garbage can.' 0 0 The defendant manufactured the cab
and chassis of the garbage truck and Leach Co. converted
the cab and chassis for use as a garbage truck for the ulti-
mate purchaser.' 0 ' Leach ordinarily sends the completed
product to the ultimate consumer and does not purchase
the chassis itself.'0 2 The plaintiff claimed that the garbage
truck was defective because it did not have a safety device
to warn the plaintiff that the truck was in reverse. 0 3 The
1,4 Id. at 22, 724 P.2d at 392.
1 5 Washington has specific statutes covering products liability which define de-
sign and warning defects similar to an action under § 402A. Id. at 23-24 n.4, 724
P.2d at 392-93 n.4.
m; Id. at 26, 724 P.2d at 394. The court considered the availability of a safety
device, the affidavit of a mechanic concerning the dangers presented at an un-
guarded nip point, and the fact that the conveyor was originally designed twenty
years before the accident and had not been modified significantly. Id.
!17 Id. at 27, 724 P.2d at 394.
I's Id. The court also held that the trial court erred in granting summary judg-
ment because a jury could find that the conveyor was defective due to Van
Doren's failure to provide a warning label or decal. Id.
1,, 581 F.2d 384 (3d Cir. 1978) (applying Virgin Islands law).
Id. at 385.
Id. at 387. The conversion process involved reducing the size of the chassis,
adding a compactor unit, and making electrical hook-ups. Id.
Id. Leach generally bills the purchaser for the conversion. Id.
Id. at 386. The complaint stated that the truck was defective because the
defendant "failed to equip the garbage truck with an operable buzzer or other
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jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff; 10 4 however,
the court of appeals reversed in favor of the defendant. t0 5
The court stated that in a case of this nature, two issues
were involved: Was there a defect? and if so, who was
responsible for it?'0 6 Addressing the first issue, the court
stated that there was ample evidence for the jury to find
that the garbage truck was defective because of the failure
to have a safety device.'0 7 As to the second issue, the
court developed a test for determining responsibility by
looking at three factors: trade custom, relative expertise,
and practicability. 0 8 The court held that there was insuf-
ficient evidence to establish a trade custom as to who
should be responsible for the installation of a safety de-
vice.'0 9 After reviewing the relative expertise of Ford and
Leach, the court determined that Leach possessed more
expertise than Ford."t0 Finally, the court held that it was
more practicable for Leach to install such a safety device
in light of the multi-purpose nature of the vehicle."'1 As a
result of this three part analysis, the court held that Ford
was not liable."' A number of courts have adopted the
three part test enunciated in Verge." t3
device which would warn [the plaintiff] and other persons foreseeably similarly
situated that the garbage truck was to be reversed." Id.
104 Id.
1- Id. at 389.
1m. Id. at 386.
107 Id.
.lot Id. at 387.
Id. at 387-88.
, Id. at 388. The court noted that Leach's business was primarily in the manu-
facture and installation of compactor units, while there was no evidence that Ford
ever installed a warning device of this kind. Id. Moreover, there was no direct
evidence that Ford knew that Leach was converting its trucks into garbage trucks
since the trucks were purchased from dealers. Id.
II Id. The court went on to state that the "vehicle... was not inherently defec-
tive when manufactured, but that it became defective soley because of additions
made by a company with decades of experience in accomplishing just this type of
modification." Id. at 389.
11 The court did state that there may be different factual situations where the
manufacturer of a component part may be held liable for failing to provide a
safety device. Id.
":, See Field v. Omaha Standard, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 323 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (admit-
ting evidence of trade custom and instruction to jury that it should consider prac-
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These cases illustrate the two basic approaches the
courts take when addressing the issue of a component
part manufacturer's liability for failure to provide a safety
device as a design defect. The Union Supply approach con-
centrates solely on the issue of whether the component
part was defective. If the product was defective, then the
component manufacturer and the assembler will be liable
for resulting injury. The Verge approach, on the other
hand, allows the jury to look at other factors in assessing
who should have provided the safety device. The factors
of trade custom, practicability and relative expertise lend
to a result that only one of the potential defendants will
be accountable for resulting injuries.
Neither the Union Supply or the Verge approach can be
termed the "majority view." The Verge approach, how-
ever, is expanding into other types of defects such as
warning defects and other design defects.' t4 As will be
discussed in the analysis of the hypotheticals, the use of
comparative fault doctrines may provide an approach
which eliminates the tendency of an "all or nothing"
result.
C. Warning Defects and Other Design Defects
Even though a manufacturer properly manufactured
the product and there is no design defect, he may still be
liable for failure to provide a warning."15 A manufacturer
will be held accountable for injuries if the product is un-
ticability, expertise and trade custom as to defective condition of a component
cab-chassis); Christner v. E.W. Bliss Co., 524 F. Supp. 1122 (M.D. Pa. 1981)
(holding that manufacturers could introduce evidence of trade customs, safety
standards and government regulations to show that absence of safety guards did
not render press defective); Ford v. Int'l Harvester Co., 430 So. 2d 912 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1983) (involving facts similar to Verge); Mott v. Callahan AMS Mach. Co.,
174 N.J. Super. at 202, 416 A.2d at 57 (applying Verge test to failure to provide
safety guards between stock reel and punch press, exposing steel coil).
- Orion Ins. Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 502 F. Supp. 173 (E.D. Pa.
1980); see infra notes 131-142 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Orion
decision.
" Frazier v. Materials Transp. Co., 609 F. Supp. 933, 935 (W.D. Pa. 1985);
Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 544 P.2d 983 (Colo. 1975).
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reasonably dangerous as a result of a failure to warn of
the dangers inherent in the product. 16 Moreover, a com-
ponent part manufacturer may be liable for a warning de-
fect with respect to the completed product." 17
The analysis of a warning defect is similar to that of a
design defect."18 A plaintiff will often assert a warning de-
fect as alternative grounds for recovery in a products lia-
bility action. Thus, the court in Union Supply stated that
the failure to provide a warning of the dangers at the "nip
point" of the conveyor system could constitute a defect
under section 402A." 9 Similarly, in Jiminez v. Dreis &
Krump Manufacturing Co. ,120 the defendant manufactured
an activating device for an industrial press machine.' 2'
Sixteen years after the defendant sold the part to an un-
known party, the plaintiff lost three fingers while operat-
ing a press machine. 22 The plaintiff brought the action
alleging failure to provide a guard mechanism and failure
to warn of the hazards of operating the press without a
guard. 23 The Second Circuit reversed a summary judg-
ment in favor of the defendant stating that there was a
jury issue as to whether the failure to provide a warning
created a defective product. 124
A different result was reached in Frazier v. Materials
Transportation Co. ,125 where the plaintiff sued the manufac-
turer of a meat dumping machine and the makers of some
of its component parts. The plaintiffjumped from the hy-
I Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 583 P.2d at 277.
117 Id.
" See id. at 283-84.
11 Id.
1-o 736 F.2d at 51.
1, Id. at 52.
,' Jiminez v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 552 F. Supp. 301, 302-03 (1982). The
activating device was incorporated into the press machine that injured the plain-
tiff. Id.
'-Jiminez, 736 F.2d at 53.
I.' ld. at 55-56. The court did not discuss warning defects in detail, merely
stating that the grant of summary judgment was inappropriate. Id. at 56. As in
Union Supply Co. v. Pust, the court's emphasis was on the liability of a component
part manufacturer for a design defect. Id. at 53-54.
609 F. Supp. at 933.
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draulic lift of the machine when he realized he could not
reach the stop button to prevent the machine from drop-
ping him into the meat grinders. 12  Namco Controls man-
ufactured switches which Materials Transportation Co.
incorporated into the machine. 27 Since Namco had no
part in the design of the machine nor in placement of the
switches, the court granted summary judgment stating
that Namco was not close enough to the chain of causa-
tion. 2 8  Similarly, the court held that Allied Power Inc.,
who supplied hydraulic pumps and valves in the machine,
could not be held liable for failure to provide a
warning. 129
A Pennsylvania state court extended the test in Verge v.
Ford Motor Co. 130 to defects other than failure to provide a
safety device. In Orion Insurance Co. v. United Technologies
Corp.,' the plaintiff brought an action alleging that
United Technologies Corporation (United) defectively
manufactured a helicopter which crashed in flight.'3 2 The
plaintiff also alleged both design and warning defects re-
lating to the helicopter's "stationary star."' 133 Amtel, Inc.
(Amtel), through a subsidiary, machined the star accord-
ing to specifications provided by a United subsidiary. 34
1- Id. at 934-35.
127 Id. at 935.
128 Id. The court stated that "[s]uppliers of component parts, no matter how
small or insignificant, should not be held to inquire into their ultimate use and
foresee all possible applications in order to satisfy a duty to warn of potential
danger associated with the finished product." Id. The court appears to have ap-
plied a duty analysis, a negligence concept, to the failure to provide a warning
under § 402A. The court in Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 583 P.2d at 284, rejected
the issue of duty to provide a safety device in design defects; see supra note 86-87
and accompanying text.
12 Frazier, 609 F. Supp. at 935-36. The court did find that there was ajury issue
as to whether Materials Transportation Co., as assembler of the finished product,
could be held liable for failure to provide a warning. Id. at 936.
',m See supra note 99-113 for a discussion of the decision in Verge.
ls, 502 F. Supp. at 173.
2 Id. at 174.
1 Id. A stationary star is a part of the main rotor head assembly on a helicop-
ter. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that the star cracked in flight thus causing the acci-
dent. Id. The defendants, on the other hand, claimed that the star fractured upon
impact of the crash. Id.
14 Id. at 175.
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Amtel moved for summary judgment, raising the issue of
whether a component part manufacturer who manufac-
tured a part to another's specifications can be liable for a
design defect. 3 5
First, the court held that Amtel reasonably relied on the
specifications of the helicopter manufacturer and thus was
not negligent. 36 In addressing the design defect claim,
the court stated that similar considerations of reliance ap-
ply. 137 The court considered the fact that United pos-
sessed superior knowledge,13  and cited with approval the
three part test in Verge.' 39 Next, the court considered the
claim of a warning defect under section 402A.' 40  The
court, relying on the Verge test, held that the responsibility
for a warning defect should also be borne by United as
manufacturer of the helicopter.' 4' Finally, the court stated
that there was no public policy interest in placing liability
1 Id. Through interrogatories, the plaintiff conceded that it could not prove a
manufacturing defect; thus, the only issue remaining was the defective design of
the star. Id. n.2.
,-- Id. at 176. The court stated that because the helicopter manufacturer had an
established reputation, "[i]t was not unreasonable as a matter of law for Amtel to-
rely on the plans." Id.
117 Id.
'" Id. The court stated that "Amtel was dealing not with specifications submit-
ted by a consumer but by a business entity with superior knowledge in the field of
aviation." Id.
'"' Id. at 177. The court also cited Taylor v. Paul 0. Abbe, Inc., 516 F.2d 145
(3d Cir. 1975). In Taylor, the defendant manufactured a replacement cylinder for
a mill owned and operated by Taylor's employer. Taylor, 516 F.2d at 146. The
defendant offered to provide, for an additional charge, a guard at the point where
the "ring and pinion gears meshed." Id. However, the purchaser rejected the
offer, and the plaintiff was injured when his hand caught in the unguarded nip
point of the gears. Id. The plaintiff claimed the component cylinder was defective
in that there was no cut off switch in the vicinity of the machine and no gear guard.
Id. at 147. The court held that imposition of these safety devices was more the
concern of the purchaser. Id. at 149. A seemingly critical factor was the offer by
the defendant to install a gear guard and the fact that the purchaser was an estab-
lished business entity with over fifty years experience in the operation of the mill.
Id. at 148.
140 Orion Ins. Co., 502 F. Supp. at 177.
141 Id. at 178. The court stated:
Just as in the safety device cases, where the Third Circuit [in Verge]
has said that the district court may consider, inter alia, the expertise
of the component part manufacturer vis-a-vis the assembler of the
finished product, I believe a similar inquiry is in order when consid-
on a component part manufacturer who followed specifi-
cations provided by others.' 42
It is important to note that the component part manu-
facturer in Orion did not participate in the design of the
stationary star. However, it is not at all clear that the
court would have reached the same result if Amtel
designed the star. The importance of the Orion decision is
that the test enunciated in Verge may be applied to an ordi-
nary design defect claim. For instance, if Amtel had
knowledge superior to United on the design of a station-
ary star, the court may have reached a different result. In
addition, the court charted new territory by applying the
Verge test to a warning defect.
In many circumstances, it is conceptually difficult to
evaluate the liability of a component part manufacturer
for failure to provide a warning. The most apparent rea-
son for this difficulty is the factor of practicability. In
many situations, it seems impracticable to require that a
component manufacturer provide a warning when his
product is incorporated in a larger product. The court in
Frazier addressed this issue in terms of causation; 43 a
court applying the Verge test, however, could analyze the
question by looking at practicability, as well as trade cus-
tom and relative expertise. As will be discussed later, a
ering whether the component part manufacturer can be held liable
for failure to warn the user.
Id.
'I. Id. The court further stated:
The effect of such a decision on component parts manufacturers
would be enormous. They would be forced to retain private experts
to review an assembler's plans and to evaluate the soundness of the
proposed use of the manufacturer's parts. The added cost of such a
procedure both financially and in terms of stifled innovation out-
weighs the pubic benefit of giving plaintiffs an additional pocket to
look to for recovery. I believe the better view is to leave the liability
for design defects where it belongs and where it now is - with the
originator and implementer of the design - the assembler ,of the
finished product.
Id.
,':' See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
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third alternative utilizing comparative fault doctrines may
provide a better approach to solving this liability issue.
V. ANALYSIS OF HYPOTHETICAL
The following discussion considers how a court might
analyze the hypotheticals posed in the introduction to this
comment.
A. Hypothetical One:
Recall that in the first hypothetical Rotor, Inc. manufac-
tured helicopter rotors that cracked during flight. Assume
that there is no claim of a manufacturing or warning de-
fect. The issue is whether the absence of a warning device
in the cockpit which would have alerted the pilot of a loss
of pressure in the helicopter rotors constitutes a design
defect under section 402A. 4 4 A jury might consider such
factors as the probability of a reduction in rotor pressure,
industry custom, the costs associated with such a device,
and whether such a device would impair the usefulness of
the product. 4 5 It appears that a jury could reasonably
find that the risks outweigh the utility associated with pi-
loting the helicopter without the warning device. 146
Assuming the plaintiff is able to prove the helicopter
was defective because of the failure to incorporate a cock-
pit warning device, the question remains as to who should
be held responsible under section 402A. Under the ra-
.4 Note that the failure to provide a warning device such as a pressure gauge is
not a warning defect. A design defect is where the absence of a design feature,
e.g., a safety device, causes the product to be unreasonably dangerous; see supra
notes 53-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of design defects. A warning
defect occurs when the manufacture fails to give adequate notice to the user or
consumer that the product itself may expose him to certain risks and danger; see
supra notes 115-117 and accompanying text for a discussion of warning defects.
145 See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of factors con-
sidered in a risk-utility analysis.
1'' See supra note 25 for a sample jury instruction for a design defect. Even
though the jury in Haas v. United Technologies Corp., 450 A.2d 1173 (Del.
1982), found that the helicopter was not defective under similar facts, it is still
possible that other jurors might reach a different conclusion.
tionale in Union Supply Co. ,147 Rotor, Inc. could not escape
liability if it believed that Helicopter, Inc. would provide a
safety device or if it was trade custom for the assembler to
provide a device.' 48 If the plaintiff is able to prove the
necessary elements of an action under section 402A,149
Rotor, Inc. will be liable for the plaintiff's injuries. Be-
cause the rotor was defectively designed, Helicopter, Inc.
and Rotor, Inc. will both be jointly and severally liable for
the injuries to the consumer.
Under the three part test of trade custom, expertise and
practicability utilized in Verge v. Ford Motor Co. ,,5 it is not
at all clear whether Rotor, Inc., as manufacturer of the
component parts, will be liable for this design defect. The
test is much more fact specific than in Union Supply Co.,
and the result will depend on the evidence presented at
trial as to these factors. It is possible that it was industry
practice for the assembler of the helicopter to provide
pressure gauges or some other warning device. Both Ro-
tor, Inc. and Helicopter, Inc. appear to have equal exper-
tise in the manufacture of helicopters. In addition, it
seems more practicable for Helicopter, Inc. to provide
some type of pressure gauge since Rotor, Inc. did not par-
ticipate in the design or assembly of the cockpit. Thus,
the jury would most likely find that only Helicopter, Inc.
should bear the responsibility for the plaintiffs injuries.
Neither of these attempts to analyze the hypothetical
take into account the availability of comparative fault doc-
trines.' 5  Suppose the jury receives the following
instruction:
Was the rotor unreasonably dangerous because of the fail-
147 Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 583 P.2d at 276; see supra notes 74-89 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of Union Supply.
14s Id. at 283.
14., See supra note 88 for the elements the Colorado Supreme Court listed in
Union Supply Co v. Pust.
-, 581 F.2d at 384; see supra notes 99-113 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of Verge.
-1 See supra notes 31-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of comparative
fault principles.
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ure to provide a warning device in the cockpit of the heli-
copter? Answer yes or no.
Was the helicopter unreasonably dangerous because of
the absence of a warning device in the cockpit of the heli-
copter? Answer yes or no.
The jury would answer the above questions based on the
definition of defect given to them by the court. 52 If the
jury answers yes to only one of the above questions, there
is no need to proceed further. Either Rotor, Inc. or Heli-
copter, Inc. will be liable.
If the jury returns the instruction answering yes to both
the above queries, then the jury must also answer the fol-
lowing question:
Find from a preponderance of the evidence the percent-




The problem with this instruction is the difficulty in com-
paring the products rather than the manufacturers when
attempting to determine causation. 53 Ajury would prob-
ably consider the manufacturers and their conduct rather
than the defective nature of the product.
Suppose instead we ask the jury the following:
Find from a preponderance of the evidence the percent-




'um See supra note 25 for examples of jury instructions incorporating the risk-
utility test and the consumer expectation test.
I.- It would be an easier case if there were two products, the component part
and the completed part, each defective and each contributing to the plaintiff's
injury. Consider a molding machine and a component switchboard. The molding
machine does not have a guard and the plaintiff's hand gets caught in the mecha-
nism. The switchboard which turns the machine off also malfunctions and the
plaintiff incurs enhanced injuries as a result. Asking the jury to compare the de-
fective molding machine and the defective component control board as to the
cause of the plaintiff's injuries is conceptually easier.
[54
Such an instruction would force the jury to consider the
conduct of the defendants and could possibly present a
negligence issue of duty. 54 Yet this would be no different
than applying the Verge three part test of trade custom,
practicability and relative expertise. The court could in-
struct the jury to consider these three factors in appor-
tioning relative fault. In this way, there is no need for an
"all or nothing" imposition of liability on either the as-
sembler or the component part manufacturer.155
B. Hypothetical Two:
Consider the second hypothetical involving a warning
defect. Recall that in the hypothetical, the component part
at issue is an "elevator trim tab actuator" which is the
control mechanism for the upward and downward move-
ment of the aircraft. The plaintiff alleges a warning defect
in that there was no warning accompanying the product
that the left and right actuators are visually identical, yet
functionally distinct. The plaintiff claims that a proper
warning would have given notice that installing the actua-
tors in reverse would cause the aircraft to crash. 56
To find that there was a warning defect, 57 the plaintiff
15 See supra notes 86 and 128 for a discussion of interjecting duty into a § 402A
analysis.
,55 Some courts may have difficulty in leaving such issues to the speculation of a
jury. For example, in Frazier v. Materials Transp. Co., 609 F. Supp. at 933, the
court refused to leave to the jury the issue of failure to warn with respect to the
component part manufacturers. The court noted "the impropriety of allowing a
jury to speculate on these causation-related issues, such as the degree of control
over the final product exercised by a parts supplier. [The component part manu-
facturer's] role in composing or attaching warnings is far too distant." Id. at 935
(emphasis added); see supra notes 125-129 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the decision in Frazier.
I.- The claim of a warning defect could be in addition to a claim that the actua-
tors were defectively designed. The actuators are defectively designed if they
were unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer taking into account the
utility of the product and the risk involved in its use. See supra note 6 for a discus-
sion of Nesselrode, 707 S.W.2d at 371. In Nesselrode, the plaintiff introduced evi-
dence of "murphy proof" design features which would eliminate or reduce the
possiblity of incorrect installation. Id. at 381.
-1 See supra notes 115-117 and accompanying text for a discussion of warning
defects.
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must show that there was either no warning or inadequate
warning of the possibility of reverse installation of the ac-
tuators, and the absence of a warning created an unrea-
sonable risk to users of the actuators. In addition, the
plaintiff must show that but for the lack of the warning,
the actuators would have been installed properly and the
risk of reverse installation was foreseeable. It appears
reasonable that a jury could find that there was inade-
quate warning and that the actuators are defective under
section 402A.
Assuming that there is a warning defect, the question
remains as to who should be held accountable for the fail-
ure to provide a warning. One way of analyzing the issue
is relatively simple. If we assume that the actuator is a
separate product and Elevator, Inc. is merely a distributor
of the product, both Actuator, Inc. and Elevator, Inc. are
liable for any injuries resulting from the defective actua-
tor. It can be argued, alternatively, that the actuator is
one product and the package is another. If this is the
case, then the Union Supply and Verge tests, as well as the
use of comparative fault doctrines, are applicable.
Under the analysis in Union Supply, both Actuator, Inc.,
as manufacturer of the component part, and Elevator,
Inc., who sells the actuator with other component parts as
a package, should be liable. As manufacturer of the actua-
tor, Actuator, Inc. could have provided a warning and
cannot escape liability by claiming that they expected Ele-
vator, Inc. to warn the user. Similarly, Elevator, Inc. sold
the product without an adequate warning and is liable for
the injuries caused to the plaintiff. Thus, Actuator, Inc.
and Elevator, Inc. are jointly and severally liable to plain-
tiff for the injuries incurred by the plaintiff under the
Union Supply analysis.
Alternatively, a court can apply the Verge three part test
of trade custom, relative expertise, and practicability to a
claim of a warning defect.' 58 The analysis is similar to the
1.1" See Orion Ins. Co., 502 F. Supp. at 173; see supra notes 139-141 and accompa-
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first hypothetical in that trade custom, the relative exper-
tise of Actuator, Inc. and Elevator, Inc. and practicability
are important in deciding whether one or the other
should bear the responsibility for the plaintiff's injuries.
Depending on the evidence presented at trial, either
party, but not both, could be held liable.
The use of comparative principles might yield entirely
different results than the analysis under Union Supply or
Verge. Suppose the jury receives the following instructions:
Was the "elevator trim tab actuator" unreasonably dan-
gerous because of the failure to provide a warning of the
possibility of reverse installation? Answer yes or no.
Was the "package" unreasonably dangerous because of
the failure to provide a warning of the possibility of re-
verse installation of the actuators? Answer yes or no.
If the jury answers both questions in the affirmative, then
the next question would be as follows:
Find from a preponderance of the evidence the percent-




Again, this instruction tends to ask the jury to compare
the conduct of the defendants, which is closer to a negli-
gence analysis than strict liability. As in the first hypothet-
ical, the result of using this comparative format also
considers the Verge factors and possibly avoids an "all or
nothing" imposition of liability.
VI. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
Although most of the cases cited in this Comment do
not involve aircraft related litigation, they nevertheless
are applicable to the industry. In a products liability ac-
tion, the plaintiff will offer all possible theories of recov-
ery which could result in- a judgment in his favor. The
hying text for discussion of the court's application of the Verge test to a warning
defect.
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first hypothetical illustrates this principle. The plaintiff in
such an action would first claim that the rotor was defec-
tively manufactured. However, there is often difficulty in
proving such a claim, and it is possible that no manufac-
turing defect existed. In addition, the plaintiff might as-
sert a design defect by showing an alternative design of
the rotor; it is possible, however, that there was no design
defect. Thus an alternative theory of liability is the failure
of the defendants to provide a safety device.
In this Comment, three different approaches were
presented concerning the problem of determining the lia-
bility of a component part manufacturer when the alleged
defect is the failure to provide a safety device or failure to
provide adequate warning. The Union Supply analysis im-
poses liability on the component part manufacturer re-
gardless of the duty or ability of the assembler of the final
product to provide a safety device. The Verge analysis ex-
amines trade custom, expertise, and practicability of the
defendants. Finally, it is possible to avoid an "all or noth-
ing" analysis by utilizing a comparative fault doctrine.
The problem with the Verge analysis and the compara-
tive fault analysis is that both inject the conduct of each of
the defendants into a strict liability cause of action.
Although comparative fault doctrines are used in strict lia-
bility actions, the focus is on comparing the product with
the negligence of the defendant(s) or the plaintiff. This is
not the same as comparing the conduct of one manufac-
turer to that of another.
One cannot say that component part manufacturers
should always be liable for failure to provide a safety de-
vice. Whether the product is defective or not when it
leaves the component part manufacturer depends on
many factors. In this respect, the Union Supply analysis
does not eliminate the possibility that the product was not
defective. The plaintiff must prove all of the elements of a
strict liability analysis under section 402A. Therefore, the
result is really not an "all or nothing" proposition. On
the other hand, if one agrees that the factors of custom,
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expertise and common sense practicability are relevant in
a strict liability analysis of the defendant, then using com-
parative fault principles would appear to be the best ap-
proach to the solution of the component part problem.

Casenotes and
Statute Notes

